Mistake is a term of art in both contract law and criminal law in England and Wales.
Contents |
Mistakes are a group of rules in English contract law, which happen to share the same name. If the law deems a mistake to be sufficiently grave, then a contract entered into on the grounds of the mistake may be void. A mistake is an incorrect understanding by one or more parties to a contract. There are essentially three types of mistakes in contract,
Res Sua, where the subject matter already belongs to oneself
Res Extincta, where subject matter does not exist
Mistake as to identity occurs when one party - usually fraudulently - believes themselves to be bargaining with another, uninvolved, third party. In a typical situation of this kind, the contract will either be void for mistake, or voidable for fraud. Such a distinction depends on the manner in which the contract was made. Cundy v Lindsay[5] demonstrates this principle; here, a firm contracted by post to sell handkerchiefs to a rogue, masquerading as a legitimate company, Blenkiron & Co. The contract was held to be void for mistake: Lindsay & Co were able to recover the goods from a third party who had purchased them from the rogue (as the rogue did not have good title (property) to pass on to them). This can be contrasted with the case of King's Norton Metal Co v Edridge Merrett & Co[6], where a similar situation occurred. Here however, the company name that the rogue used did not exist; as in Cundy v Lindsay, Kings Norton Metal Co could not claim they relied upon the false company name to contract. Therefore the contract was merely voidable for fraud, and the third party obtained good title to the goods.
A further distinction which can be drawn is where a contract is made face to face; that is, generally, in shops and markets. Where a contract is concluded this way, there is a strong presumption inferred by the courts that the seller intends to contract with the person in front of them. Thus in this situation it is much harder for the seller to claim a contract is void for mistake to identity. The principle is well demonstrated in the famous case of Phillips v Brooks[7]. However, the law becomes somewhat convoluted and less certain when considering subsequent decisions, such as Ingram v Little[8]. The principle has recently been upheld (albeit by a small margin of 3 to 2) in the House of Lords decision of Shogun Finance Ltd v Hudson[9], despite persuasive reasoning to abandon it. The current situation can be seen as less than ideal, as it is the third party buyer who loses out when contracts are considered void for mistake to identity. In Shogun Finance Ltd v Hudson the minority of Lord Nicholls and Lord Millett argued strongly that all mistakes for identity merely render a contract voidable.
Mistake of fact may be a defence in criminal law if is genuine, whether or not it is reasonable.
In DPP v Morgan and others[10] an RAF man told three officers to have sex with his wife, and she would pretend to refuse just to be stimulating. They pleaded mistake, and the jury did not believe them.
In R v Williams (Gladstone),[11] the facts were, according to Lord Lane, as follows:
On the day in question the alleged victim, a man called Mason, saw a black youth seizing the handbag belonging to a woman who was shopping. He caught up with the youth end held him, he said with a view to taking him to a nearby police station, but the youth broke free from his grip. Mason caught the youth again and knocked him to the ground, and he then twisted one of the youth's arm behind his back in order to immobilise him and to enable him, so he said, once again to take the youth to a police station. The youth was struggling and calling for help at this time, and no one disputed that fact.Upon the scene then came the appellant who had only seen the latter stages of this incident. According to Mason he told the appellant first of all that he was arresting the youth for mugging the lady and secondly, that he, Mason, was a police officer. That was not true. He was asked for his warrant card, which obviously was not forthcoming, and thereupon something of a struggle ensued between Mason on the one band and the appellant and others on the other hand. In the course of these events Mason sustained injuries to his face, loosened teeth and bleeding gums.
The appellant put forward the following version of events. He said he was returning from work by bus, when he saw Mason dragging the youth along and striking him again and again. He was so concerned about the matter that he rapidly got off the bus and made his way to the scene and asked Mason what on earth he was doing. In short he said that he punched Mason because he thought if he did so he would save the youth from further beating and what he described as torture.
Mr Williams was prosecuted for assault occasioning actual bodily harm. In delivering the judgement of the Court of Appeal, Lord Lane said:
The reasonableness or unreasonableness of the defendant's belief is material to the question of whether the belief was held by the defendant at all. If the belief was in fact held its unreasonableness, so far as guilt or innocence is concerned, is neither here nor there.[12]
An exception to this appears to be bigamy (see R v Tolson (1889) 23 QBD 168).
The Sexual Offences Act 2003 has introduced a hybrid test of reasonable belief as to consent. The defendant must now be seen to have taken steps to ascertain clearly whether the "victim" was consenting in all the circumstances. This abolishes the defence of a genuine though unreasonably mistaken belief as to the consent.
It is not a defence that the defendant held an honest and reasonable belief that what he was doing was not criminal.[13] Where the defendant is a foreigner, and the offence is not criminal in his own country, the fact of such a belief is still not a defence.[14] It is not a defence that the defendant believed that he would not be prosecuted for what he was doing.[15]
Section 3(2) of the Statutory Instruments Act 1946 provides:
In any proceedings against any person for an offence consisting of a contravention of any such statutory instrument, it shall be a defence to prove that the instrument had not been issued by [or under the authority of] His Majesty’s Stationery Office at the date of the alleged contravention unless it is proved that at that date reasonable steps had been taken for the purpose of bringing the purport of the instrument to the notice of the public, or of persons likely to be affected by it, or of the person charged.
(Words in brackets inserted by section 1(1)(a) of the Statutory Instruments (Production and Sale) Act 1996, as read with section 1(2))
A mistake about the civil law may have the effect of negativing the mens rea for an offence. See:
|
||||||||||||||